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The Newest African-Americans?: 
Somali Struggles for Belonging
Cawo M. Abdi
America is God’s crucible, the great Melting-Pot where all the races 
of Europe are melting and reforming!…The real American has not yet 
arrived. He is only in the crucible, I tell you—he will be the fusion of all 
races.—Israel Zangwill
Not merely a nation but a nation of nations.—Lyndon B. Johnson
I. Introduction
Migration anchors the essence of what it means to be an American. 
The “imagined community” is made up of individuals, their parents, 
grandparents or even great-grandparents, who crossed oceans to seek 
better pastures for their families. In other words, America is synon-
ymous with migration. At its core, it remains characterized by the 
different waves of immigrants from across the world who, over the 
last five centuries, sought their fortunes and fates in this beautiful 
land. However, being an American is also a contested notion, one that 
over its long history too often failed to measure up to its ideals. The 
slavery of Africans as well as the brutal treatment and extermination 
of many Native Americans also anchor the idea of belonging to this 
nation. From the founding of the nation at the end of the 18th century, 
cracks and contradictions in its ideals continue to manifest themselves 
through institutionalized discrimination and the exclusion of certain 
groups within its diverse population.
It is this history of racial and class division and how it shapes the 
settlement experience of the latest waves of migrants today that will 
be the focus of this essay. Drawing from years of primary research 
with Somalis in Minnesota and Ohio and other regions of the globe 
as well as secondary data, I want to locate Somali migration expe-
riences within the wider debates about integration and the path to 
citizenship. My aim is to provide a portrait of some of the key chal-
lenges Somalis are experiencing in urban America and their impli-
cations for settlement and “belonging.” I argue that this community 
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is reaping some of the benefits associated with migration while also 
becoming entrenched in inner-city, segregated urban America and is 
thus not enjoying full citizenship. The first part of the analysis pro-
vides a review of the assimilation debate and its iterations over the last 
century. I find that understanding this concept and the critiques lev-
eled against it are essential for new migration streams into the United 
States. The second part of the article historicizes Somali migration and 
the context and content of the 1990s Somali influx into North America. 
This will be followed by a discussion of two key factors that I identify 
as being the bedrock of Somali experiences: Somali refugees’ limited 
human capital and their ongoing financial obligations to families left 
behind. These factors are vital to Somalis’ physical and emotional sur-
vival everywhere, while they also impede their settlement in America. 
The conclusion assesses the theoretical and policy implications of these 
challenges for citizenship and future Somali-American prospects.
II. Migration Waves: Assimilation, Alienation, and In-Between
The earliest scholars of migration explored the questions of identity 
and belonging, and the process of settlement and integration into the 
American community. These scholars, however, exclusively focused 
on the late 19th-century and early 20th-century European newcomers 
in metropolitan American cities. The Holy Grail in migration studies 
as to how to understand the Americanization process centers on the 
notion of assimilation. One 1921 definition of this concept came from 
the Chicago School, where Robert Park and E. W. Burgess defined it as 
“a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups 
acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and 
groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated 
with them in common cultural life.”1 This concept attempts to capture 
the process by which migrants take on the economic and socio-cultural 
characteristics of the majority population that they joined.2 Early stud-
ies on these ethnic groups found that assimilation was definitely a pro-
cess that took generations. As Alba and Nee put it, “[It] was only with 
the third, and in some cases, the fourth generations that the powerful 
undercurrent of assimilation came unmistakably to the surface.”3
The dominant framework was that European migrants would, over a 
mere few generations, “melt” into the American mainstream or become 
acculturated into what some scholars called American “core culture.”4 
Milton Gordon’s view was in fact normative in that it idealized the 
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white Protestant and Anglo-Saxon middle-class economic and socio-
cultural model as representing the culmination of assimilation in its 
full cycle.5 The political context in which this debate occurred explains 
the attractiveness of assimilation, or what Israel Zangwill called the 
ideal of the American “Melting Pot” of all races. This “offered an ideal-
istic vision of American society and identity as arising from the biolog-
ical and cultural fusion of different peoples.”6 This nationalist vision 
attempted to erase or undermine ethnic attachments to distant lands 
and was in line with nationalist discourses in war times.
Different European groups, however, arrived at “assimilation” via 
different routes. For instance, unlike the earlier waves of Northern 
and Western European migrants, those from Eastern and Southern 
Europe experienced discrimination and even racialization that stig-
matized them as inferior to the Anglo-Saxon stock in America.7 The 
newest European immigrants still strove to distinguish themselves 
from the African-Americans, who occupied the lowest rungs in the 
racial hierarchy in America.8 Their exclusion from the “core culture” 
was accompanied by their assertion of difference and superiority to 
African-Americans during the Jim Crow era. Despite their early expe-
riences of racial and religious bigotry, these stigmatized groups even-
tually became part of the dominant “white” groups in America, as 
they integrated through socioeconomic mobility and intermarriage 
as well as residential integration. Other groups remained excluded 
from the assimilation debate. Illustrating their Eurocentricism in who 
was deemed capable of assimilation, early proponents of this position 
wrote:
In America it has become proverbial that a Pole, Lithuanian, or Norwe-
gian cannot be distinguished, in the second generation, from an Ameri-
can born of native parents…As a matter of fact, the ease and rapidity 
with which aliens, under existing conditions in the United States, have 
been able to assimilate themselves to the customs and manners of Amer-
ican life have enabled this country to swallow and digest every sort of 
normal human difference, except the purely external ones, like color of the 
skin.9
Similarly, even scholars writing in late 20th century presented the 
inevitable “truth” of the racial dynamics in America already acknowl-
edged by Park and Burgess.10 In this vein, Alba and Nee wrote in 1997 
that:
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The most intractable racial boundary remains that separating those 
deemed phenotypically black from whites. This boundary is likely to exert a 
powerful influence on the adaptation possibilities of immigrant groups, 
depending on where they are situated with respect to it… . 11
Understandably, then, the assimilation paradigm of the first part of 
the 20th century came under fire with the civil rights movement and 
the 1965 immigration law reforms, which transformed the source and 
the characteristics of immigrants. Prior to this time, American immi-
gration laws curtailed non-European migration with discriminatory 
quotas that were only favorable to Europe.12 Hence, 1965 immigra-
tion policy reforms represented progressive attempts in line with the 
civil rights debates of the day and eliminated the legal discrimina-
tion embedded in earlier quota systems. These developments not only 
transformed policies dealing with American race relations, but also 
ushered in a new direction for assimilation debates.
Scholars focusing on post-1965 migration, which was dominated 
by non-Europeans, highlight how race and ethnicity factor in to the 
Americanization experience. The former disregard or even attempt to 
explain the experiences of African-Americans, as well as the diversity 
of the Asian and South American dominated migrations, undermined 
the old straight-line conceptualization of assimilation. The emerg-
ing discourse on migrant settlements analyzed the structural barri-
ers intrinsic in American racial stratification and its consequences for 
migrants of color. Scholars such as Glazer, Moynihan, and Portes high-
lighted how racial stratification and structural conditions in America 
can block assimilation outright. This racial and ethnic disadvantage 
perspective brings to the fore how factors other than agency and social 
capital can play a pivotal role in whether groups integrate economi-
cally, residentially, and politically. This is not to say that race or ethnic-
ity is solely a burden, but rather that these can be both resources as 
well as burdens in migrants’ pursuit of mobility.13 A more recent exten-
sion of this debate combines the straight-line assimilation arguments 
with the ethnic/racial disadvantage paradigm. Portes’ and Min Zhou’s 
formulation of “segmented assimilation” underscores that while 
assimilation defined as upward mobility and integration of newcom-
ers holds true for some skilled migrants enjoying high levels of human 
capital, the opposite is true for the majority of labor migrants of color, 
who also assimilate, but join those on the margins of American racial 
and socioeconomic stratification.14 Attention to the structural barriers 
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that Americans on the margins—as well as millions of labor migrants 
with extremely limited human capital—confront in America is key to 
understanding the type of assimilation that occurs and how race and 
class factor into this process. This formulation pays attention to “the 
contextual, structural and cultural factors” that lead to divergent paths 
of assimilation.15
III. Portrait: Somali Migration to America
Somalis are part of an increasing African migration trend that com-
menced in the 1970s. Though migrants and refugees categorized as 
“Black” in the American racial scheme remain numerically small when 
compared to Asians and Latin Americans, this group nevertheless rep-
resents a significant segment of the American ethnic mosaic. Accord-
ing to the Population Reference Bureau, immigration accounted for “at 
least one-fifth of the growth in the U.S. black population between 2001 
and 2006.”16 Those from the African continent accounted for one-third 
of the foreign-born blacks in America in 2005.17 The African presence 
in the United States is intrinsically tied to the founding of this nation, 
when millions of enslaved Africans were transported for plantation 
work. Following the abolition of slavery in the early 19th century, there 
was virtually little or no migration from the African continent to the 
Americas. Black migration to the United States in the first part of the 
20th century only consisted of small numbers originating in the Carib-
bean. This changed with the liberalization of immigration laws, which 
also coincided with technological advancements in travel as well as the 
independence of many African nations and subsequent economic and 
political turmoil in post-colonial Africa.
It is within this historical context that the political catastrophe in 
Somalia triggered one of the largest refugee resettlement programs 
in the United States. In fact, Somalis are the largest African refugee 
population in the U.S. today, accounting for 5.5 percent of all refugees 
admitted between 1983 and 2000, but 25.4 percent of those admitted 
between 2001 and 2005.18 For the latter time frame, only Cuba has sent 
more refugees to the U.S. (31.4%). The state of Minnesota has become 
home to two of the largest refugee populations in recent history: the 
Hmong in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Somalis since the early 1990s. 
The Somali refugee presence in Minnesota owes much to the strong 
voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) in this Midwestern state. These organi-
zations sponsor and assist refugee resettlement programs. A combina-
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tion of the very strong Minnesota economy in the early 1990s (with 
unemployment dipping to around 2 percent in the late 1990s, the low-
est rate in the whole country19) and the presence of the robust refugee 
assistance network largely explain the Somali concentration in Minne-
sota. Chain migration naturally follows once you have a large enough 
number of any group establishing itself in a given metropolitan set-
ting, with newcomers benefiting from the settlement experiences of 
earlier migrants, with their accumulated knowledge of local practices 
and institutions.
Somali migration to America is hence a recent phenomenon and 
only took off following the collapse of the Somali state in the late 1980s. 
Close to 100,000 Somalis have been granted refugee status since 1990. 
This number excludes those born in the United States, which is proba-
bly a significant population given this community’s high birth rate.20 A 
small number of Somali students came to the U.S. in the 1960s through 
the 1980s. Some of these students returned once they completed their 
education, whereas some had no choice but to stay on in America, with 
a change in immigrant status from student to asylee or refugee. Thus, 
the analysis of Somali migration to America over the last two decades 
covers an extremely narrow span of time, and mostly involves data 
collected from the first generation and their children. The analysis and 
conclusions presented on Somali settlement thus represent reflections 
on the trajectory of this emerging community in its relations with other 
groups in America as well as its adjustment to its new home.
IV. Refugee Status, Family Obligations, and Relative Poverty
Two key factors integral to understanding Somali settlement experi-
ences in America are the limited human capital that they came with 
and their financial obligations to kin left behind. First, human capital 
refers to Somali refugees’ overall educational levels and language and 
other knowledge and skills. While Somalis who came to the U.S. prior 
to the collapse had higher educational levels, the majority of newcom-
ers had very low levels of formal schooling. The opportunities avail-
able to the majority of Somali youth to acquire formal education in a 
predominantly nomadic society were severely limited. Except for a 
small number who were educated through an English curriculum in 
the Northern parts of Somalia and another group that were educated 
either in Italian or Arabic in the South, formal educational institutions 
were non-existent in colonial Somalia. Positive legacies of the dictato-
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rial regime of Siad Barre were the Somali script in the early 1970s and 
the expansion of educational opportunities to a larger segment of the 
population in towns and cities. Educational opportunities involved 
primary and secondary education in Somali, with limited post-second-
ary educational prospects. Consequently, even Somali refugees who 
had some post-secondary education in the home country came to the 
Western world with very limited English language skills and with edu-
cational credentials that were difficult to transfer to American labor 
markets. This limited human capital has great ramifications for their 
settlement in America.
The second factor that is instrumental in our understanding of the 
Somali settlement experience involves the collapse of the Somali state 
in the late 1980s and the resulting displacement and impoverishment 
of millions whose physical and material security was utterly compro-
mised. More than a million Somalis fled to Kenya and Ethiopia and 
in fact hundreds of thousands of them remain in a protracted refugee 
condition. Those who made it out of these difficult circumstances and 
who arrived in the developed world have left their immediate and 
extended family members in these precarious situations. Strong fam-
ily ties inherited from Somali culture and the Islamic faith promote 
a commitment to support and provide for dozens or even hundreds 
of kin left behind. Such obligation is significant for Somali migration 
and settlement strategies and has real consequences for their socioeco-
nomic tactics and attitudes toward their new society.
V. Federal and State Refugee Assistance Laws
Understanding the refuge experiences of survival in a context of dis-
persion and settlement in different parts of the globe is crucial in order 
to appreciate refugee agency while remaining cognizant of entrenched 
structural barriers migrants and refugees confront in America. The 
social and economic challenges Somali refugees are experiencing in 
the United States remain steep. In contrast to labor migrants, refu-
gees automatically qualify for numerous types of federal, state, and 
local support to assist them in their settlement and integration process. 
Though refugee assistance in the form of cash that VOLAGs provide 
is limited to less than year, the majority of refugee families qualify for 
cash assistance, food stamps, and subsidized housing, as well as medi-
cal care, through their federal and state human and health services 
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departments. This provision remains vital for poor refugees’ economic 
and survival strategizing.
My ethnographic work within this community leads me to conclude 
that social services remain a crucial part of the economic survival of 
Somali refugees in America as well as other developed nations. A large 
segment of this refugee community, including intact families who have 
at least one parent working, depends on these services. State assistance 
is crucial for these families since one parent’s salary is unlikely to meet 
the subsistence needs, the market price housing rental, and the sky-
rocketing private healthcare insurance required for a family. This holds 
true for most Somali men and women who either work in low-paying 
jobs in which healthcare is not provided, or work as taxi or truck driv-
ers, or run small family stores that only cater to their co-ethnics.
There is rich scholarship that details the marginal economic oppor-
tunities available to low-skilled refugees in American metropolitan 
areas in the current post-Industrial economy.21 Access to state and fed-
eral support, which are reduced over a longer stay in the country, 
continues to be essential for refugee families whose decisions and eco-
nomic strategizing require them to maximize public benefits as well as 
employment income. Like many other poor Americans, Somalis often 
combine work and public assistance, and thus benefit from many state 
and federal services as well as local charity organizations while pur-
suing educational and employment opportunities. Minnesota Family 
Investment Program (MFIP) data from the Minnesota Department of 
Human Services shows that an important segment of the Somali popu-
lation relies on public assistance for their everyday survival. MFIP 
helps low-income families with children to meet their basic economic 
needs, through cash grants for a limited term of sixty months as well 
as with food stamps. This program also assists individuals in accessing 
skills and language training. Utilizing these services does not mean that 
these individuals are not in the labor force. On the contrary, Somalis on 
MFIP have higher average reported earned income than whites and 
African-Americans on this program, with an average monthly earning 
of $1,065, second only to Asian-American income.22 Urgent demands 
to support families left behind in conflict zones, whose needs take pre-
cedence over attempts to pursue educational and skills development, 
can hinder these commendable efforts. Stretching an income that is 
already low relative to the mainstream standard in order to meet the 
basic needs of multiple families unfortunately has major consequences 
for the refugee household in America.23 This cycle of work, public 
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assistance, and financial remittances to families elsewhere diminishes 
the ability of individuals and families to save and to execute long-term 
financial planning for them and their children. Many resort to sur-
vival techniques that involve planning from month to month, placing 
them in a precarious socioeconomic position. Consequently, Somalis 
accounted for over six percent of all MFIP eligible adults in Minnesota 
from 2003 to 2009. This group is thus overrepresented on public assis-
tance rolls and has lower levels of success in welfare-to-work efforts 
than all other groups, including Hmong refugees and African-Ameri-
cans.24
The overall level of human capital in this refugee population in part 
explains the high dependency on government support. For example, 
Somalis have one of the lowest rates of high school completion of MFIP 
participants.25 Overrepresentation in government assistance ranks 
and its consequences also emerge from the recent American Com-
munity Survey, which highlights Somali refugees’ marginal socioeco-
nomic position within the larger American society. This report found 
that Somalis experience extreme poverty rates when compared to all 
groups, including other African migrants, other black migrants from 
the Caribbean, and African-Americans. The 2007 American Commu-
nity Survey found Somalis to have the highest poverty rate of all new-
comers to America, closely followed by those born in Iraq and the 
Dominican Republic. At a 51 percent poverty rate, this level of poverty 
was in fact four times the national rate in the U.S. for that year, and 
double that of African-Americans.26 This high poverty rate is in stark 
contrast with the average median income of Muslims in America, a 
group hailed as “Middle Class and mostly mainstream” by a recent 
Pew Research Center Report. Muslim Americans on average compare 
well to the U.S. public in terms of education and income, with 41 per-
cent of Muslim families having an average median income of $50, 000 
or more annually (compared to 44% of the general population).27 Con-
sequently, Somalis arguably stand in an extreme position when com-
pared to other Muslims in America, as well as to the African-American 
population, which on average fares worst in all social-economic indi-
cators. Going back to our earlier theoretical discussions of how new 
groups might be integrated into their new societies, high poverty rates 
translate to Somali integration into the lowest strata in the racial and 
economic stratification in America.
This statistical data relating to welfare dependency, as well as the 
findings from the American Community Survey, are consistent with 
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my findings from ethnographic work with the Somali community. 
What emerges from this research is the difficulty of securing sources 
of income that are sufficient to permit them to get off public assistance. 
This is especially the case for women with children, who in the Min-
nesota case account for 84 percent of Somali families on MFIP.28 Most 
of these individuals have very limited language and training skills, 
and thus have an extremely difficult time joining the labor force for 
any length of time. While pressured by MFIP to train and seek employ-
ment, hundreds of Somali women that I have interviewed report that 
they fail to let go of this safety net. Their only employment options 
are often in sectors like janitorial services that require them to work at 
night when they have childcare commitments. A small number of these 
women end up seeking strategies to extend their sixty-month eligibil-
ity on the grounds of health and disability. Again, while the trauma 
of civil war and the violence that followed probably explains some of 
these requests, such applications are often made out of desperation for 
the need for public assistance, which is critical to both their survival 
and the survival of their kin back in Africa.
In addition to income insecurity, access to decent housing remains 
an integral part of immigrants’ integration. Consistent with the persist-
ing racial and economic segregation in America,29 refugee newcomers 
become part of the American socioeconomic stratification that sepa-
rates inner-city dwellers from those in suburbia. Inner-city America 
continues to be dominated by racially marginalized groups that are 
mostly composed of African-Americans and Hispanics.30 Moreover, 
inner-city areas are often plagued by crime, violence, and poorly per-
forming schools. Refugees and many labor migrants of color who can-
not afford high rental prices come into direct contact and competition 
with those in the lowest socioeconomic strata in the American com-
munity. These groups’ inclusion into inner-city America supports the 
segmented assimilation approach that Portes and Zhou postulated, 
and results in the racialization of newcomers of color into the Black 
American category.
Somalis distinguish themselves from African-American inner-city 
residents. Their low level of human capital and their financial obliga-
tions to kin left behind, however, promote their active pursuit of afford-
able public housing. This produces the strong intra-ethnic resource of 
a highly developed Somali network to share information about public 
housing across the nation. Some families even travel to faraway places 
that do not have large refugee populations, such as North Dakota or 
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Nashville, to secure public housing or Section 8 certificates, with the 
plan to eventually return to their original state. Clearly this testifies to 
the desperation for affordable housing that many refugees experience. 
Market costs of $1,000–$1,500 for apartments and houses remain out 
of reach for many who are reliant on government subsidies often com-
bined with low-paid, unskilled work. That this income is shared with 
dozens of immediate and extended family members elsewhere and is 
thus stretched beyond its limits further makes public housing demand 
within this community understandable. The stigma mainstream Amer-
icans attach to inner-city housing was non-existent for Somali refugees 
when they got here. This is changing, however. Recent media cover-
age of Somalis living in very dangerous public housing complexes 
in Omaha, Nebraska, illustrates the discrepancy between the security 
concerns of these refugees, who fled from civil war, and the crime and 
drug problems that plague some of these inner-city areas. Somali fami-
lies in this public housing became so terrorized by the constant threats 
and crime in their neighborhood that they stopped coming out of their 
houses, and even stopped sending their children to school.31
In states with significant numbers of Somalis, one can find whole 
public or subsidized housing complexes that are now predominantly 
Somali residential areas. Examples of these include the Cedar-Riv-
erside area in Minneapolis, the Lexington complexes or Afton View 
apartments in St. Paul, and the Capital Park apartments in Columbus, 
Ohio. Some of these housing complexes were formerly African-Ameri-
can areas, but these have been replaced by a flow of Somalis who 
share information about the units and their availability, and thus cre-
ate a “chain” replacement and concentration, or segregated, area. One 
positive consequence is the creation of a community niche within these 
alien urban centers where Somalis find psychological security within 
their own group. Moreover, these areas provide business opportunities 
for a small number of these refugees, with halal groceries and cloth-
ing stores, such as those in Karmel and Mall 24 in Minneapolis. But 
the overall depression that plagues these areas with low-performing 
schools and high crime rates persists and negatively impacts newcom-
ers. Somalis are now becoming more apprehensive about the conse-
quences of this type of housing for them and their children, but most 
continue to view affordable housing, no matter where this might be 
located and no matter its stigma, as a requirement in order to survive 
while fulfilling their multiple commitments to family members in dif-
ferent parts of the world.
Cawo M. Abdi
101
Public assistance and public housing are indisputably necessary 
for the initial survival of newcomers. Yet potential ramifications for 
the prospect of success of the “1.5 generation,” or those who arrive 
as children to the U.S., as well as the second generation and beyond, 
require attention. Research on black Caribbeans in the U.S. shows that 
most first-generation Caribbean parents brought with them strong 
cultural and human capital. This group resisted American racializa-
tion schemes with concerted efforts to distinguish themselves from 
the African-American population—through overt usages of accent, 
through claims of having a better work ethic, and through assertive-
ness that differs from that of African-American employees. Many of 
their children nevertheless became integrated into the African-Ameri-
can inner-city cultural attitudes toward mainstream society as well as 
institutions. This represents “segmented assimilation,” or the integra-
tion of different groups into various sectors of society, with the expec-
tation that those immigrants whose socioeconomic and human capital 
most resembles those of African-Americans will fare worse than oth-
ers.32 Mary Waters, who has done extensive work on this topic as it 
relates to West Indian migrants, cogently argues that these parents’ 
strong cultural and human capital cannot compete with the institution-
alized American racial discrimination.33 She shows how “residential 
segregation and de facto educational segregation” influence the life 
chances and future prospects of many in the second generation.34 The 
second-generation Caribbeans identify with their African-American 
peers with a perspective informed by a sense of exclusion, “outsider-
ness,” and of not benefiting from the American dream. The experiences 
of “Black” immigrants are important for our Somali case study and 
especially for the prospects of the younger population in this group. 
Data from the Census Bureau shows that Somalis constituted the 
group with the youngest population of all foreign-born groups, with 
a median age of 26.8 (compared to an average median age of 36.7 for 
all U.S. residents).35 How the 1.5 generation as well as the very young 
first generation fare in the educational and employment spheres will 
influence the trajectory of Somalis either as part of the lowest strata in 
American society or as part of an integrated Muslim-American com-
munity, maintaining its cultural and religious identity while integrat-
ing into mainstream America.
Finally, integration in America entails enjoying the rights granted to 
all citizens, which intrinsically brings to the fore the role of the nation-
state in allocating rights and responsibilities to its members. These 
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rights include civil rights (rule of law, free speech, etc.), political rights 
(participating in the political process, elections, voting, etc.), and social 
rights (provision of welfare, health care, unemployment insurance, 
disability insurance, etc.). The degree of provision of any given right, 
however, differs from country to country in most developed Western 
democracies. For example, the social rights provided to Canadians or 
to the British, such as universal health care, continue to be contested in 
the United States. Also, accessing federal public services is highly stig-
matized in the American context, in which social citizenship debates 
lag those of Europe.36 Fraser and Gordon point out that in the United 
States:
Receipt of welfare is usually grounds for disrespect—a threat to, rather 
than a realization of, citizenship. In the area of social services, the word 
‘public’ is often pejorative. Public hospitals are institutions of last resort, 
sites of stigma, not solidarity. The connotations of citizenship are often 
positive, powerful, and proud, while those of welfare are so negative, 
weak, and degraded that social citizenship here sounds like an oxymo-
ron.37
Fraser and Gordon’s discussion of this stigma highlights a key chal-
lenge Somalis confront to full citizenship in the American context. Of 
course, other poor and marginalized groups also experience this chal-
lenge, which involves how individuals in any given society actively 
engage in shaping their nation-state. As Isin and Siemiatycki put it, 
“citizenship is not a static experience: citizens actively struggle to 
change both the meaning and boundaries of citizenship itself.”38 Thus, 
citizenship becomes a practice, a lived experience, in which members 
of a given society shape and are also shaped by full engagement with 
the social, economic, and political institutions that prevail in a given 
historical moment.39 Somali migration at its core was due to a failure of 
the freedom to practice citizenship, with dictatorial rule that limited all 
rights and then with myopic warlords that toppled one dictator to sub-
ject people to multiple forms of terror. One can argue that the notion of 
citizenship in both its legal and sociological varieties is a new concept 
for Somalis living in the American context. Access to public services, 
protection from violence, and the ability to vote (once naturalized) are 
all common rights that Somalis are accessing. But Somali experiences 
of pervasive poverty and segregation, as well as their classification 
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as a pariah public burden—or what Fraser and Gordon call “charity 
cases”—can curtail their full exercise of citizenship.40
VI. Conclusion
This essay has two conceptual and two policy implications that I 
would like to emphasize. It is important to reiterate the very short time 
span that has passed since Somalis settled in the United States in large 
numbers. Their struggles are in many ways consistent with what ear-
lier groups with similar socioeconomic and educational backgrounds 
endured. Hence, one should not read this analysis as a suggestion 
that their current condition is their destiny. Theoretically, the Somali 
case reinforces the trends observed in earlier analyses, such as Portes’ 
and Zhou’s, which point out the barriers to integration that unskilled, 
post-1965 migrants of color confront in the American arena.41 This 
case study shows how Somalis’ low level of human capital contrib-
utes to their marginalization in the United States. However, there is a 
dual process at play in this case: while segmented assimilation stresses 
the process of new groups with low human capital joining those on 
the margins of society, this Somali case study shows how they volun-
tarily segregate and distinguish themselves from African-Americans. 
This group is also involuntarily being segregated from mainstream 
white America by socioeconomic imperatives pushing them into pub-
lic housing. Thus, the nature of the Somali location in the American 
stratification system testifies to this refugee groups’ agency in reject-
ing American racialization schemes, while structural conditions place 
them in marginal inner-city ghettoes. Given the recent nature of Somali 
migration, it is difficult to know how the 1.5 generation and the sec-
ond generation will fare, but trends observed in the schooling and 
resources available in the areas in which Somalis are concentrating 
indicate a continuation of this segregation and further marginalization 
within the wider American society.
A second conceptual implication relates to the exercise of citizen-
ship. While segregation might provide a certain level of security for 
a group thanks to ethnic cooperation and shared resources, its long-
term impact is detrimental for all of society. It undermines shared 
interests across racial and class divisions. Moreover, limited contact 
across groups entrenches prejudices and separation, with some groups 
becoming further excluded from belonging to the imagined commu-
nity.42 The irony is that while Somalis’ co-ethnic interdependency in 
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America, as well as with their kin elsewhere, represents the ultimate 
citizenship ideal of common destiny and mutual obligation and solidar-
ity, their exclusion and limited resources in America place them on the 
margins of mainstream America’s understanding of social rights. That 
view is intrinsically based on the “contractual” agreement whereby 
only those who contribute to the pot may draw benefits from the social 
contract.43 Somalis contribute to different pots: one in Somalia, where 
millions of people are surviving thanks to remittances from low-wage 
and low-prestige employment in America, often combined with Amer-
ican social service benefits. They also contribute to an American pot in 
the form of cheap labor. These contributions, however, are viewed as 
incommensurate with what they draw out, which can generate resent-
ment from mainstream Americans who stigmatize them as burden-
some and parasitic.
This essay also provides two important policy ideas. A commu-
nity that is relatively new and relies heavily on public provisions is 
bound to face a backlash on the policy front. Similar to some European 
nations, the current economic recession the United States is pushing 
for severe austerity measures that include restrictions on public assis-
tance. Despite this environment, understanding the multiple compet-
ing obligations that migrants and refugees negotiate everyday can help 
policymakers better address the challenges migrants confront in their 
integration process. For migrants to reap the myriad opportunities 
America provides, there needs to be a more concerted effort to incor-
porate them into the American fold, through better-funded programs 
to build migrant and refugees’ meager human capital. Such investment 
enriches the American mosaic and the American economy, with new-
comers fostering a rich, diverse, and productive American labor force.
Second, an investment in programs that promote a better under-
standing of what it means to be an American, with knowledge of the 
beauty as well as the ugly scars in the history of this great nation, can 
also accelerate the newcomers’ process of integration. Such understand-
ing would permit newcomers to appreciate the long struggles of minor-
ities, such as African-Americans, as well as the contentious dynamics 
of nation building in which Americans of all races participated. Such 
an investment would support new immigrants in better understand-
ing their citizenship rights as well as obligations. The absence of such 
policy-level efforts will lead to limited immigrant engagement with the 
greater society and with American institutions. This can only further 
entrench their marginalization and undermine their participation in 
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the political process. Remaining on the margins of society entails dev-
astating long-term repercussions for future Somali-Americans, and we 
all have an obligation to prevent such a calamity.
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